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The Investment Development Path (IDP) hypothesis holds that a country’s net outward
direct investment position is systematically related to its level of economic development.
Ireland is an interesting test case because of the importance of inward FDI over the last
three decades, the country's rapid recent FDI-fuelled growth, and the recent increase in
outward FDI by Irish-owned multinationals.  We find empirical support for the IDP
concept for the Irish case.  Our sectoral analysis shows up important differences between
Ireland's outward FDI and the bulk of FDI occurring in the world economy however.
Ireland's outward FDI flows are as yet almost exclusively horizontal and they go largely
into non-internationally-tradable manufacturing and services sectors.  Also, the firm-
specific assets of Irish multinationals lie neither in R&D nor in the type of product
differentiation associated with high advertising expenditures.
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Introduction
Dunning (1981, 1986) and Dunning and Narula (1996) argue that a country or region’s
net outward direct investment position is systematically related to its level of economic
development.  This notion, formalised in the concept of the investment development path
(IDP), proposes that at relatively early stages of economic development direct investment
is primarily incoming, as firms from the backward region will not have accumulated the
firm-specific assets that allow firms to set up successfully outside their home base; Caves
(1996); Dunning (1988).
As development proceeds however, learning-by-doing enhances the firm-specific assets
of indigenous firms, allowing outward direct investment to begin.  At the same time,
development causes an erosion of the country’s absolute cost competitiveness, which
impacts on the incentive for inward investment.  At a still later stage, the country’s net
outward investment position becomes positive, as the nature of both inward and outward
investments change.  Inward investment in richer countries is more concerned with
technology sourcing and market access than with the costs of production, while outward
investment grows as domestic firms seek to maintain or expand competitiveness by
locating production processes in lower production-cost countries.
1
In this paper we examine whether the development of inward and outward investment in
Ireland fits in with the IDP concept.  Ireland represents an interesting test case for the
IDP hypotheses for two reasons.  First is the very rapid pace of economic development
enjoyed over the last  decade: income per head, measured as GNP per capita at
purchasing-power-parity prices, rose from less than 65 percent of the UK level in 1990 to2
rough equality with the UK (and the EU average) today, while net job creation over the
same period exceeded the rate achieved even by the US, traditionally the world's "job
creation dynamo".
2  It is of interest to ask whether traces of the postulated dynamic
patterns in the net foreign investment position can be seen over such a relatively short
period of rapid growth.  Secondly, of course, there is the fact that Ireland has relied far
more heavily than other EU countries on inward FDI flows as the driving force behind
manufacturing-sector development.  This is reflected in the data in Table 1 on the share
of manufacturing sector employment in foreign-owned firms.
Table 1 here
Given the magnitude of inward FDI it is not clear whether the patterns postulated by the
IDP, with outward FDI rising over time to match the levels of inward investment, are as
much in evidence as in economies with less dramatic inward flows.  We investigate this
issue by examining the overall patterns of inward and outward FDI in Ireland in Section
1.  Section 2 looks at bilateral FDI between Ireland and the US, and estimates an
econometric model of the IDP following Buckley and Castro (1998).  In Section 3 we
examine the differences in sectoral destination between Ireland's inward and outward FDI
flows, and Section 4 summarises the lessons learnt from the analysis.
1. Ireland’s Inward and Outward FDI Flows
Total FDI outflow data (to all countries) is available for Ireland only for the last few
years.  A view of the historical record may be gleaned however from UNCTAD (1999)
                                                                                                                                           
1 The basic validity of the concept is supported by the fact that outward FDI is generated almost exclusively
by developed countries, and that these countries also account for about 75 percent of inward FDI.
2 GNP is used here as it excludes the profits earned by foreign firms producing in Ireland.  Irish GDP per
head is higher still.3
data on inward and outward investment stocks (as a percentage of GDP).  These show
Ireland in the late 1990s as having the third highest stock of inward investment in the EU,
after Belgium/Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  Ireland’s outward investment stock on
the other hand was third lowest, after Greece, Portugal and Austria.  This suggests that
until recently outward FDI flows from Ireland were not very large, as the IDP concept
would suggest.
Table 2 here
In looking at flow data, it is important to distinguish between inflows into the
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in Dublin and inflows into other sectors of
the Irish economy.  The IFSC, founded in 1987, is one of Europe’s largest off-shore
financial centres.  Inward investment here entails the transfer of capital by foreign
companies to their financial subsidiaries at the IFSC.  These inflows are then mostly
reinvested in overseas assets.  Thus, direct-investment inflows into the IFSC are roughly
matched by outward flows of portfolio investment, with little impact on the productive
potential of the economy; Forfás (2000).  We therefore attempt to exclude such flows of
funds from our discussion.
The Irish Central Statistics Office has recently started to publish data on inward and
outward FDI flows. Inward direct investment into non-IFSC sectors in Ireland came to
£2.8 billion (Irish pounds) in 1998, rising to £4.8 billion in 1999.
3  Surprisingly, given the
historical levels of such inflows and their importance, illustrated above, outward flows
for these two years almost matched the inward flows.  Outward flows totalled £2.7 billion
                                               
3 An Irish pound is worth roughly 1.3 euros.4
in 1998 and £4 billion in 1999.
4  It is estimated that these outflows rose from a level of
less than £1 billion at the beginning of the decade.  These numbers also tend to support
the investment development path concept.
To take the analysis further requires information on both the geographic and sectoral
destination of these outflows.  Let us consider the geographic destination first.  All data
sources agree on the pre-eminence of the US and the UK as host locations.  UNCTAD for
example reported that the US received 47 percent of Irish companies’ spend on overseas
acquisitions in the period 1995-97, while the UK received 38 percent.  This is
corroborated by the evidence in Table 2 drawn from a database on overseas acquisitions
by Irish companies.
5  Over 80 percent of overseas acquisitions were made in the UK and
U.S. with the U.S. being the most important destination for Irish overseas acquisitions in
1997.
Table 2 here
Growth over time in the stock of Irish FDI in the UK is further confirmed by UK Office
of National Statistics data, which reports on numbers employed in foreign-owned firms in
the UK manufacturing sector.  In the first year these data were reported, 1981, Irish-
owned firms employed 8,900 workers in the UK.  By 1996 this had climbed to over
23,000.
6
For the two years for which Irish Central Statistics Office data is available, 1998 and
1999, around 70 percent of FDI outflows from Ireland went to non-EU countries, which
                                               
4 Roughly half of the outflows in each year were funded by Irish companies reinvesting foreign earnings,
with the remainder funded by a mix of equity and other (primarily debt) capital.
5 Note that this data is different from outward FDI since the acquisitions may be funded through a variety
of non-FDI as well as FDI sources.
6 ONS Summary Volume - Manufacturing, Table 9.5
suggests that the US has been growing in importance as a host location in recent years.
Given the scarcity of Irish source data on outward flows, we are fortunate in having US
Department of Commerce data on foreign-owned assets in that country.
7  As the US is
also the most important source of FDI flows into Ireland, we concentrate in the next
section of the paper on what the US data tell us about bilateral Irish-US FDI flows.
8
2. Ireland-US Bilateral FDI Flows
Table 3 shows that over the course of the 1980s and 1990s Irish FDI in the US grew even
more rapidly that US FDI in Ireland.  This result is quite surprising, given the focus of
academics and policy makers on Ireland as a host country for inward investment, rather
than as a base for outward investment.
Table 3 here
The employment associated with Irish non-bank affiliates in the US (which is
unfortunately the only employment data available to us) also increased considerably over
the period.  As shown in Figure 1, these numbers increased steadily from around 10,000
in the early 1980s to approximately 39,000 in 1997 and then surged to 65,000 in 1998
due to a spate of acquisitions of US firms.  This should be seen in the context of
development in the US-owned affiliate sector in Ireland over the period, where
employment grew from around 38,000 in 1982 to 65,500 in 1997 and 70,400 in 1998.
Figure 1 here
                                               
7 These data are available in the publication Survey of Current Business and on the Bureau of Economic
Analysis website (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di1.htm).
8 See also Görg (2000) for a further, more detailed analysis of the Ireland-US bilateral FDI relationship.6
Although the IDP concept outlined earlier relates to a country’s total net outward
investment position, we propose to explore it in terms of the bilateral investment
relationship between Ireland and the US.  We argue that this is of interest not only
because the US is the most important source country for FDI in Ireland, but is also, as
seen earlier, one of the most important, if not the pre-eminent, destination for Irish
outward FDI flows.
Figure 2 plots Ireland’s net outward position with the US over the period 1980 to 1999.
Note firstly that it has remained negative: FDI inflows from the US have been
consistently higher than Irish outflows to the US.  Secondly however, the pattern over
this period which was marked by very rapid development of the Irish economy does
indeed look like the U-curve predicted by the IDP.
To analyse the relationship between the net outward investment (NOI) position and
economic development more formally, Dunning (1981) suggests regressing NOI on GDP,
utilising a quadratic specification to allow for the non-linearity in the relationship.
Dunning (1981) and, more recently, Dunning and Narula (1996) estimate this relationship
for a cross-section of different developed and developing countries, and find statistical
support for the use of such quadratic specifications.  Evidence of such a non-linear
relationship has also been presented recently for Portugal by Buckley and Castro (1998),
employing time series data for the period 1943 to 1996.
Following these studies, we analyse the IDP relationship for Ireland’s net outward
position with the US (NOI = outward – inward FDI stocks) by estimating the following
model:
NOI = b0 + b1GDP + b2GDP
2 + e (1)7
where GDP is real gross domestic product in Ireland and e is a regression error term.
Estimating this equation using data for the period 1980 to 1999 yields the following
result:
NOI = -325.609 - 0.172 GDP + 1.78e-06 GDP
2 (2)
(575.424) (0.027) (0.27e-06)
where the numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
9  The
R-squared obtained is 0.66.  The negative sign of the coefficient on GDP, and the
positive sign on the GDP-squared coefficient (which are both statistically significant at
the one per cent level), provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between Irish GDP
and the country’s net outward FDI position with the US, a pattern consistent with the IDP
concept.
3. Sectoral Destination of Ireland’s Inward and Outward FDI Flows
The Investment Development Path concept discussed earlier does not have much to say
about differences in the sectoral destinations of FDI inflows and outflows.  Indeed it does
not clearly distinguish between vertical and horizontal flows.
10  The process of economic
development would seem to have two implications of relevance.  The first is that as
production costs (and particularly labour costs) rise, this strengthens the incentive for
domestic firms to engage in vertical FDI, shifting the labour-intensive segments of the
production process abroad to lower-wage countries.  The second is that as domestic firms
reap the benefits of learning-by-doing, they become able to compete successfully in the
home markets of earlier-developed countries, and so engage in horizontal FDI.
                                               
9 Note that the reported estimation corrects for heteroskedasticity, which was detected in
the initial regression, using the White (1980) estimator of variance. The Durbin-Watson
statistic, dw(3,18)=1.97, indicates that first-order autocorrelation is not a problem.
10 Vertical flows are associated with the international fragmentation of production, driven by factor costs,
while horizontal flows are associated with goods-market access considerations.8
The IDP literature remains silent on the relative strength and timing of these two effects.
Our reading of the Irish situation, as explained below, indicates that the bulk of Irish
outward FDI is of the horizontal type.  Our sectoral analysis gives us an indication as to
why this is the case.  Indeed it is in raising and exploring this issue that we feel we make
a contribution to the development of the IDP concept.  It appears worthwhile to attempt
and incorporate the distinction of vertical and horizontal FDI into the concept.
Services versus Manufacturing
Let us look first at the sectoral destination of FDI inflows into Ireland.  Most FDI into
services other than the IFSC is thought to stem from the UK; Forfás (2000).  If we take
UK FDI in Ireland as an upper bound on FDI in non-IFSC Irish services, FDI in services
comes to a total of around 25 percent of the stock of non-IFSC FDI in Ireland.
11   The
share of Irish FDI flows into the US that go into services, on the other hand, is around 55
percent.  Much of Ireland's outwards FDI going to the UK also goes into services, as is
clear from Table 4 and other evidence on Irish acquisitions of overseas retail sales
outlets.  Thus our first conclusion on sectoral destinations is that outflows from Ireland
go primarily into services while inflows come primarily into manufacturing.
12
Sectoral Destination of FDI Outflows from Ireland
The conclusion on outflows into services is supported by data on the overseas operations
of the 10 largest Irish companies in Table 4.  Forfás (2000) argues that much of Ireland’s
outward FDI comes from these ten companies, and that overseas investment by small and
                                               
11 This could be considered as an upper bound as the UK is also an important investor in manufacturing
industries; Barry and Bradley (1997).
12 The share of US FDI assets in manufacturing in Ireland fell to 44 percent in 1999.  If we exclude the
share of US assets in IFSC related activities however, manufacturing’s share in the remainder (what we are
tempted to call “real” US FDI inflows) rises to above 70 percent.9
medium Irish enterprises is low by European standards.  Note that four of these
companies are located in services sectors.
Table 4 here
It is clear from this table that besides services companies there is a strong representation
of firms in non-tradable manufacturing activities in the list of Irish firms with overseas
operations.  The most important of these are in sectors such as building materials and
paper and packaging.  This evidence is supported by material assembled by Enterprise
Ireland, the government agency tasked with supporting domestic manufacturing and
software firms.  Table 5 lists employment in Enterprise Ireland supported firms in 1999.
The data shows that over 40 percent of employment by Irish firms abroad is in the sector
which includes the two largely non-traded manufacturing goods.  Expansion abroad in
both these fields of activity, services and non-tradable manufacturing, entails horizontal
rather than vertical FDI.  If these companies expand abroad they do so for market-access
reasons, i.e., in order to penetrate and grow in new markets.
Table 5 here
Why do we see so little vertical FDI outflows from Ireland?  Here we need to remind
ourselves of the reasons why firms choose to set up production facilities abroad.  These
are based on the importance of intangible firm-specific (or proprietary) assets, the full
benefits of which are more easily reaped through intra-firm rather than conventional
market relationships.  R&D and superior product differentiation through advertising are
generally found to be the most important firm-specific assets associated with
multinationality; Caves (1996), Markusen (1995).10
Of the sectors with which the leading Irish firms are associated, only pharmaceuticals and
some segments of food are advertising-intensive, according to Davies and Lyons (1996,
Table A2.1).  It will also be apparent that only one of the firms listed in Tables 4, Elan, is
located in what the OECD (1994) classify as a high-technology sector.  This is also the
only one of these companies to feature in a list of the top thirteen patent holders among
Irish indigenous enterprises; O'Sullivan's (2000).
Irish multinational companies do not appear therefore to follow the standard pattern
associated with multinationality.  As R&D, technology and advertising related
characteristics do not appear to be important for the majority of Irish multinationals, we
may conjecture that their predominant proprietary assets appear to be in the management
field in largely non-traded sectors.
This explains the lack of vertical multinationalisation.  It is also worth bearing in mind
that, as Caves (1995, p.83) pointed out, factors such as R&D and advertising that
generally give rise to MNEs also represent barriers to entry into these industries.  The fact
that the proprietary assets of Irish MNEs do not lie in these areas serves as an illustration
of the difficulties facing firms in late-developing regions in surmounting the entry
barriers that characterise more conventionally multinational sectors.
Finally, before looking briefly at the sectoral characteristics of inward investments, we
should mention the fact that growing numbers of Irish “new economy” firms have
recently begun to set up operations in the US.
13,14  Why should high-tech firms from a
                                               
13 The acquisitions associated with most of these firms are small however, on the order of
several million Irish pounds, paling in comparison to the £840 million spent by AIB on
US purchases in 1997, the £418 million spent on US acquisitions by CRH in 1996 and
the £82 million spent by Waterford Wedgewood in 1999.11
relatively peripheral region be drawn to set up US operations so early in their lives?
According to Cryan (1999) the answer revolves around the need to network.  Without a
local presence there is little possibility of being featured in the US press, of developing
relationships with computer vendors or of attracting the attention of venture capitalists.
The importance of a US base is summed up by one venture capitalist who is quoted as
saying:
"I will not invest in a company that is any more than a 35-minute drive from my office.  I
need to keep an eye on my investment and it's very difficult to do that if the company
headquarters is 6,000 miles away."
15
This outward FDI is also driven by market-access considerations therefore.
16
Sectoral Destination of FDI Inflows into Ireland
As much has been written about FDI flows into Ireland (see, for example, Görg and
Strobl, 2001 and Barry and Bradley, 1997) we can deal with this material briefly,
focussing only on the contrast between the sectoral destinations of inflows and outflows.
Table 6 below shows the most important sectoral destinations for inflows, measured in
terms of share of employment in foreign-owned industry in Ireland.
Table 6 here
Recall that almost no high-technology sectors were represented in the group that served
as destinations for FDI outflows.  By contrast, most of the sectors which attract  FDI
                                                                                                                                           
14 To the (still relatively small) extent that Ireland exhibits outward FDI in modern
sectors, this appears to have developed through a symbiotic relationship with inward FDI
rather than as an automatic consequence of economic convergence, as appears to be the
perspective advocated by Dunning; on the indigenous Irish software sector, for example,
see Ó Riain (1997).
15 Irish Times, Friday, March 26, 1999.
16 The fact that production-cost considerations (in this case the cost of venture capital) also come into play
does not prevent it being classed as horizontal investment.12
inflows are so classified.
17  Of the nine sectors listed here, the top five are classed as
high-tech by OECD (1994).  Of the remaining four, two are classed as medium
technology (motor vehicles and chemicals) and two as low technology (food and
textiles).  Within the food sector, furthermore, 90 percent of foreign employment is in
segments classified by Davies and Lyons (1996, table A2.1) as ones in which advertising
expenditures are important.  This reflects the standard pattern found internationally.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we report evidence on inward and outward FDI flows for Ireland.  Inflows
have grown substantially over time, and are generally regarded as being the driving force
behind the economy’s dramatic recent growth; Görg and Ruane (2000), Barry (1999).
According to Eurostat, no other EU country had as high a ratio of inward to outward
investment flows in the late 1990s.  We have pointed out however that outflows from
Ireland have grown even more sharply than inflows in recent times.  This evidence is
consistent with the “investment development path” (IDP) hypothesised by Dunning
(1981, 1986).
Due to the dearth of consistent time-series data on outflows from Ireland we cannot
evaluate the IDP hypothesis empirically on total FDI stocks or flows.  The US is the most
important source of FDI flows into Ireland, however, and the evidence adduced here
suggests that it has also become the most important destination for Irish outflows.  We
therefore utilise US data to test the IDP hypothesis on bilateral Irish-US flows, and our
results confirm those of previous studies.
                                               
17 This difference in the technological orientation of the destinations of inward and outward FDI flows is
further supported by balance of payments data.  In 1999 for example, the country paid out over £5 billion in
overseas royalties and licence payments while receiving only £300 million.13
We go on to analyse the sectoral destinations of inflows and outflows, on which the IDP
hypothesis is silent.  We show that most Irish outflows to the US are in the services
sector, while most inflows are into manufacturing.  This appears to be the case for the
aggregate (as opposed to bilateral) data also.  Furthermore, most manufacturing outflows
are into classic non-traded sectors, such as construction materials and paper and
packaging, while this is assuredly not the case for FDI inflows into Ireland; over 90% of
the output of the foreign-owned segment of Irish manufacturing is exported
The sectoral destination of outward FDI flows from Ireland is somewhat reminiscent of
the discussion in Caves (1995, p.238-240) of developing-country multinationals.  Irish
firms have clearly not (yet?) surmounted the formidable entry barriers associated with the
development of firm-specific assets based on R&D and strong product differentiation, as
O’Malley (1987) predicted.
The proprietary assets associated with Irish MNEs appear instead to be managerial in
nature, and to be located almost exclusive in (non-traded) downstream sectors; this does
not appear to create a strong incentive to engage in vertical multinationality (as opposed
to conventional trade) in accessing upstream inputs.
Much of the literature analysing the implications of outward investment focuses on
vertical investments, whereby labour-intensive segments of the production process are
shifted abroad.  Blomström et al. (1997) for example find for US firms that increased
foreign production is associated with reduced employment in the parent company.  This
can lead to an expansion of headquarters services and high-skill employment in the home
base however.  Locating abroad to source new technologies on the other hand may lead to
a downsizing of domestic R&D facilities and high-skill employment; Blomström and14
Kokko (2000).
18  Technology sourcing may also be associated with positive externalities
however, as argued by Globerman et al. (2000).
With most Irish FDI outflows concentrated in lower technology sectors, spillover benefits
from headquarters services in Ireland may be less likely to arise than in the case of firms
whose proprietary assets lie in R&D.  In the case of Ireland's "new economy" firms
locating in the US however, the various offsetting effects discussed above may arise, and
should be worth exploring.
Overall, the Irish experience supports the view that as poorer countries converge on
richer ones the sectoral destination of their FDI outflows will reflect a different pattern
from that observed in the outflows from earlier-developed economies.  It should be
worthwhile investigating whether this hypothesis is borne out in the case of other late
industrialisers also.
                                               
18 This may be seen as an example of the type of agglomeration effects that inhibited the development of
dynamic industrial sectors outside the European core at the time of the Industrial Revolution; Pollard
(1985).15
Table 1: Proportion of Manufacturing Employment in Foreign-Owned Firms


















Source: OECD (1999) Measuring Globalisation: The Role of Multinationals in OECD
Economies
Table 2: Overseas Acquisitions by Irish Companies
Region 1995 1996 1997
£000 % £000 % £000 %
UK 453,350 67 979,140 42 484,190 24
US 64,550 10 999,300 43 1,300,060 66
ROW 157,650 23 371,100 15 197,996 10
Source: CFM Capital (various years) Acquisitions Survey
Table 3: Outward and Inward FDI Stocks
(in million $ at 1996 prices)
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 1999
Irish FDI in US 174 318 476 1702 2413 4840 12842 17222
US FDI in 3957 5332 5700 5608 8305 8150 15472 1899816
Ireland
Note: both data series were deflated using the US GDP deflator available at
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/hist.html#h10.
Source: own calculations based on US Department of Commerce data17
Table 4: Overseas Operations of the 10 Largest Irish Companies
Company/
Sector
Activity basis Ireland US UK ROW
Allied Irish Bank (banking)
a Assets 48 26 24 2
Bank of Ireland (banking) Assets 60 12 19 9
Elan (pharmaceuticals) Turnover - 19 - 81
CRH (building materials)
b Turnover 13 49 19 28
Smurfit (paper and packaging)
c Turnover 11 7 11 71
Irish Life (insurance) Premiums 61 26 11 2
Kerry (food) Turnover 22 36 - 42
Independent (newspapers) Turnover 43 - 6 51
Waterford Wedgewood (glass) Turnover 7 38 24 31
Greencore (food) Turnover 78 - - 22
Notes: 
a Having entered the market in 1988, AIB is now one of the 50 largest bank holding companies in
the US, with assets of close to $20 billion and a workforce of 6,500.
b Following recent acquisitions, CRH's expanded US materials businesses now has sales of some £1 billion
per annum, and annual output of 400 million tons of aggregates, 15 tons of asphalt and 2.7 million cubic
yards of ready-mixed concrete.
c The recent merger of Smurfit's US operations with Stone Container makes it one of the five biggest
producers in the packaging industry, and these five now control nearly 60 per cent of North American
capacity.
Table 5: Overseas Employment of Irish Firms outside the Financial Sector




                54,957                 (44%)
Engineering                 18,388                 (15)
Electronics and Precision Components 2656                  (2)
Food and Drink 44047                  (35)
Timber and Furniture                       511
Consumer products                       523
Software and International Services   5080                     (4)
Total                126,162
Table 6: Sectoral Destinations of FDI Inflows into Ireland
Sector Share of employment in
foreign-owned industry
Professional Instruments 9.6 %
Electrical Apparatus 9.2 %
Communications Equipment 8.8 %
Pharmaceuticals 8.8 %
Office and Computing Machinery 8.7 %18
Food 8.5 %
Motor Vehicles 6.5 %
Textiles 6.3 %
Chemical Products 5.3 %19
Figure 1



























































urce: own calculations based on US Department of Commerce data20
Figure 2
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